The Challenge of Migration: Is Liberalism the Problem? by Schubert, Karsten
www.ssoar.info




Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schubert, K. (2021). The Challenge of Migration: Is Liberalism the Problem? Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie -
Beihefte, 167(167), 173-192. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-72891-4
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence




Schubert, Karsten (2021): The Challenge of Migration. Is Liberalism the Prob-
lem? In: Kirste, Stephan; Paulo, Norbert (ed.): Populism. Perspectives From Le-
gal Philosophy. Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beihefte (ARSP-B), Vol. 
167, 173 – 192. 
 
Accepted Manuscript - feel free to write me for a pdf of the published version. 
 
 
The Challenge of Migration. Is Liberalism the Problem? 
Karsten Schubert 
 
Abstract: The challenge of developing humane migration and refugee politics in Western 
states is far from resolved. This ongoing failure is typically attributed to the increased influ-
ence of right-wing populism and neo-fascism in Western migration politics. In this article 
I discuss a more radical explanation: Christoph Menke argues that political liberalism and 
its framing of migration as an issue of subjective human rights is the deeper root of the 
problem. While the merit of Menke’s approach is its criticism of subjectification through 
individual rights that blocks politics, I show that his Critique of Rights may lead to an anti-
pluralist and paternalistic ‘radical republicanism’. To react to this problem, I propose a ‘re-
flective liberalism’ that allows to criticise subjectification without abandoning the form of 
individual rights. This position, which I develop through a discussion of Foucault’s concept 
of ‘freedom as critique’, shows that in addition to protecting minorities such as migrants, 
individual rights turn out to be part of a regime of critical subjectification that constitutes 
critical subjects. Such critical subjectification by law can help to break through the blockade 
of politics that prevent the development of humane migration and refugee politics. 
I. Introduction 
Europe’s not taking action in order to protect refugees and migrants in European camps 
during the COVID-19 pandemic received little public outcry. While migration ceased to 
be in the centre of discursive attention, the challenge of developing humane migration 
politics is far from resolved. The ongoing failure of Western states to develop such politics 
is typically attributed to the increased influence of right-wing populism and neo-fascism 
in Western migration politics. In this article I discuss a more radical explanation: Liberalism 
is the deeper root of the problem. Not specific political parties and powers lead to inhu-
mane politics, but the liberal form of individual rights that causes the framing of migration 
politics as a human rights issue is the very reason for the exclusion of refugees. Analysing 
both the merits and the shortcomings of this explanation, I propose a new concept of 
reflective liberalism that is based on individual rights while overcoming their negative ef-
fects. Instead of plainly following conventional human rights arguments or rejecting them 
altogether, reflective liberalism offers a productive framework for the development humane 
migration politics. This argument also entails the following position on the critique of ex-
isting political and legal institutions and forms: It is not helpful to totally reject them; they 
should rather be immanently reprogramed and rebuilt for emancipative purposes. 
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While the critique of liberalism has a longstanding tradition in political theory, 
Christoph Menke’s Critique of Rights1 opens a new phase by combining the critique of 
liberal individual rights with an analysis of subjectification through liberal law. Menke em-
ploys this critique of liberal law to the problem of refugees and migration, bringing the 
continuous debate on the critique of human rights and their failure to protect refugees, 
which is mostly inspired by Arendt’s analysis of stateless persons, to a new level of philo-
sophical depth.2 In what follows, I first reconstruct Menke’s argument, explaining that the 
merit of his approach is to problematise subjectification through individual rights, which 
produces amoralist subjects and a depoliticised society . Following Foucault, subjectification 
means the constitution of subjects through power, which leads to potential repression and 
‘inner’ unfreedom. In liberal subjectification it is the unfreedom of adhering to the liberal 
“Myth of the Given”3 that makes subjects conceptualise their individual will as natural and 
presocial. Following this myth, individual rights aim to protect the individual will from 
political interference and thereby block politics. Hence Menke calls for a radical, that is, 
unlimited re-politicisation. Secondly, I criticize Menke by pointing out that he dismisses 
the emancipative function of liberal individual rights too quickly and employs a universalist 
concept of political reason that is anti-pluralistic. He thereby opens a dangerous possibility 
of political paternalism, which is why I call his philosophy ‘radical republicanism’. This leads 
to the question of how it is possible to criticize subjectification without falling into political 
paternalism. In the third step, I propose to answer this question by employing Michel Fou-
cault’s theory of subjectification and freedom. With Foucault it is possible to conceptualize 
a new reflective liberalism that can address the problem of subjectification while avoiding 
the pitfalls of paternalism, which amounts to a conceptual connection between freedom 
and critique; in short: freedom as critique. This notion of freedom as the capability to crit-
icize one’s own subjectification entails a demand for ‘modal robustness’, that is, its institu-
tionalisation. Breaking with the anti-institutionalist anarchism that dominates Foucault 
scholarship makes possible the conception of an individual rights regime against paternal-
ism that is not pathologically committed to the “myth of the given”. This equidistance from 
Menke’s call for radical politicisation through universal political reason on one hand, and 
from its opposite, Foucauldian anarchism on the other, makes reflective liberalism especially 
suitable for a realist conception of emancipatory politics in relation to existing political 
institutions. In the fourth concluding section I briefly sketch out how these foundational 
reflections on political theory help understand the challenge of developing humane migra-
tion policies. 
II. Migration and Menke’s Critique of Rights 
Menke takes recourse to Hannah Arendt’s famous critique of human rights, which she 
develops analysing the situation of stateless persons after the European wars. He connects 
Arendt’s analysis with the situation of today’s refugees and migrants, and thereby constructs 
 
1 Christoph Menke, Critique of rights, 2020, German original: Christoph Menke, Kritik 
der Rechte, 2015 
2 Christoph Menke, Zurück zu Hannah Arendt – die Flüchtlinge und die Krise der  
Menschenrechte, Merkur 70 (2016), 49–58 
3 Menke (footnote 1), 118–19, 124, 145–46 
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the argument that it is liberalism which is the problem, more precisely an atomistic social 
ontology. Arendt shows that a general exclusion from society, that is, total rightlessness, is 
the fundamental problem of the stateless persons. Or, formulated positively, the necessary 
condition to enjoy the rights catalogued as ‘human rights’ consists of membership in a 
society. Arendt calls this necessary condition ‘the right to have rights’, that is, a right to 
membership in human society. Following Aristotelian social ontology, Arendt explains hu-
man beings are zoon politikon, intrinsically social beings. This is why excluding a human 
being from human society is a dehumanising act, and the inclusion into human society is 
the fundamental human right.4 Drawing on this social ontology, Menke points out a con-
tradiction between conceiving human beings as intrinsically social and the very idea of 
individual human rights. Individual subjective human rights are the product of liberal po-
litical philosophy, which conceptualizes human beings in an atomistic social ontology, de-
fining them as individuals with a natural will, which is fundamentally different from to the 
Aristotelian holistic social ontology.5 
Menke claims that through this Aristotelian social ontology, Arendt radically 
changes the dominant debate about refugees. This debate is posing the human rights of the 
individuals (idealising camp) against the interests of the group (realist camp) and reflects on 
the question of how much a certain group (mostly constructed as national states) owes to 
certain individuals6, because it is confined by the premises of liberalism. The concept of the 
right to have right points out, according to Menke, that the refugee is always already a 
member of society. The liberal framework rejects this membership, because it rejects the 
very idea of membership, as it treats human beings as atomized individuals, instead of as 
social beings who are defined by their very membership. While the liberal debate about 
rights frames the problem as denying the refugee something that ‘we’ have (for example, 
the right to be ‘integrated’ in ‘our’ society), Menke claims that the denial is more general. 
Liberal societies do not even give ‘real’ membership to their own members, because they 
are based on the idea of individual rights (Menke 2016, 57). 
Migration politics receives that much populist attention and political cleavage, ac-
cording to Menke, because it puts in question our very identity, bringing into question 
who we are. We are, currently, liberals who only act according to a catalogue of human 
rights, which are effectively linked to national civil rights – regardless of the evolvement of 
the international human rights framework. We do not act following the right to have rights, 
that is, seeing and treating everybody as a member of human society. Menke’s assessment 
of the situation is clear: We have to escape our liberalism if we really want to change our 
policies regarding refugees and migration. 
In Critique of Rights (2020, German 2015) Menke elaborates on the problem of 
liberalism and its form of individual rights in greater detail. According to Menke, individual 
 
4 Cf. Hannah Arendt, Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht, Die Wandlung 4 (1949), 
754–770, 759 ff. 
5 For the distinction between an atomistic and a holistic social ontology see Charles Tay-
lor, Cross-Purposes, in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum, 1989, 159–
182, who develops these concepts to structure and clarify the debate between liberalism 
and communitarianism in the American political theory community. 
6 Cf. Menke (footnote 2), 55. 
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rights are the foundation of modern societies, which have invented the specific liberal form 
of individual rights. While ancient and Roman law was thought to express justice, reason-
able order, and ethical life, in modernity the will of individuals becomes the philosophical 
foundation of law.7 The individual will is understood as a pre-social force of nature and 
individual freedom, and modern law aims at the recognition and protection of this nature. 
Therefore, modern law is based on individual rights, and individual rights are “(juridical) 
claims to (natural) claims, the juridical authorisation of natural power.”8 The form of mod-
ern individual rights completely revolutionizes the relationship between norm and nature 
and puts nature in the foreground.9 Natural rights are now primary to law; the ‘objective 
right’ is set up in order to secure ‘individual right’.10  
This modern primacy of rights has fundamental effects on society, as it changes the 
self-conception of human beings – and it determines who we are today. While liberalism’s 
natural law tradition views the autonomous subject as the ground for individual rights, 
Menke critically turns the relationship of causation around through a quasi-genealogical 
analysis: We do not have the liberal order to secure our freedom and our natural, individual 
will, as classical liberalism argues, but we see ourselves as individual subjects only because 
of the liberal legal order. This is subjectification by law. The autonomous and individual 
subject, freed from normative reasoning through individual rights, is the product of the 
primacy of rights in liberal law. As this critique of subjectification is central to Menke’s 
argument, his Critique of Rights ownes way more to Foucault’s thinking than the rather 
short explicit discussion of Foucault in the book would suggest. By protecting the individ-
ual will from political influence, the liberal law creates the “morally indifferent self-will”11, 
and thus leads to an amoral society without normative reasons. The private will of the 
subject is protected from the interference of politics and ethics. Because the will does not 
have to justify itself, politics is blocked as a process of justification; bourgeois society is a 
depoliticized society deprived of ethical life.12 
At the same time, according to Menke, modern law has the historical chance of 
reflexivity and emancipation – which it forfeits, however, because it is only realized in its 
bourgeois form of decay, subjectifying people to think their will as natural and independent 
of society and politics. Modern law is, according to Menke, fundamentally reflexive because 
 
7 Menke (footnote 1), 32. The following discussion of Menke’s Critique of Rights is 
based on research that I also draw upon to discuss institutions in post-foundationalist and 
post-marxist political theory, cf. Karsten Schubert, Institutionalisierung der Freiheit im 
Recht, in Institutionen des Politischen, ed. Steffen K. Herrmann / Matthias Flatscher, 
2020, 351–378. 
8 Menke (footnote 1), 37 
9 Menke (footnote 1), 24 
10 The very difference between ‘das Recht’ und ‘einem Recht’, between ‘law’ as the legal 
order and ‘rights’ as individual claims, is a modern invention and can be dated back to 
Wilhelm von Ockham (approx. 1288–1347), and is already taken for granted by Thomas 
Hobbes (1588–1679). The term “subjektives Recht” (right) in difference to “objektives 
Recht” (law) is used to make this distinction explicit, given that both concepts are signi-
fied by the same word “Recht” Menke (footnote 1), 9 ff. 
11 Menke (footnote 1), 191 
12 Menke (footnote 1), 259 
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it makes manifest the gulf between law and non-law for the first time. In traditional law, 
the gulf between law and non-law was reconciled in a higher order and unity (nature in 
ancient law, reason in Roman law), i. e. by a fundamentalist conception that makes the 
arbitrariness of law invisible. The innovation of modern law is that it highlights and reflects 
its own loophole. The reflection of the paradoxical relation of nature and law is modern 
law’s way out of traditionalist fundamentalism. In other words: Modern law knows that 
there is no legality and morality given in nature (as it was believed in Roman and ancient 
law), and therefore opens the possibility of reflecting on this unfoundedness. Reflexive 
modern law sees itself in interaction with non-law, it can conceptualize that it can itself 
have negative effects on society – for example, that a certain liberal legal and property 
system leads to impoverishment – and it can respond to such effects. Within this framework, 
complex legal mechanisms of proceduralisation and democratic control are established.13 
Menke’s criticism of modern law, however, is that its reflexivity is only conceptual 
or potential; the only realized form of modern law is bourgeois law, which blocks this re-
flexivity. It does so by essentialising nature through law, which is the opposite of an under-
standing of the relationship between law and nature as dialectic. Instead of reflecting on 
how it constitutes subjects – the processes of subjectification through law as Foucault would 
call it – law’s subjectification works through the neglection of its own effects by conceptu-
alising subjects with a natural, pre-social, and unchangeable will and interest. Menke calls 
this “empiricism or positivism” and, in reference to Wilfrid Sellars, the “Myth of the 
Given”.14 The fundamental problem of this positivism, according to Menke, is that the 
subject, which law creates by aiming at the protection of its will and interest, is an amoral-
istic subject without normative reason, just like the liberal-bourgeois society.15 The onto-
logical innovation (and failure) of bourgeois law consists in creating a radically selfish and 
antisocial society based exclusively on the private will of individuals. The innovation is that 
individual will is not tested against political normativity, as in traditional law. The private 
will of the subject is protected against politics and ethics. Because the will does not have to 
justify itself, politics as a process of justification is blocked; the bourgeois society is a depo-
liticized society.16 Property rights are the main form of individual rights that depoliticise in 
this way; they are rights to the exclusion of others, enforced not only against other indi-
viduals but against ethics and reason altogether. The essence of property is to be free from 
normative and political demands regarding the use of the property.17 The bourgeois de-
 
13 Cf. Menke (footnote 1), 95 ff. Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungen-
schaft, Rechtshistorisches Journal 9 (1990), 176–220 is an explanation of this process: 
Through the constitution law can be structurally coupled with politics, which enables the 
institutionalization of change in law, thus the capability to react to political struggles and 
social changes. 
14 Menke (footnote 1), 123, 145 
15 Cf. Menke (footnote 1), 144–147, 180–181. 
16 Cf. Menke (footnote 1), 259 
17 Cf. Menke (footnote 1), 149 ff. Even social rights, normally positioned against liberal 
rights, are based on the paradigm of subjective rights according to Menke, as they shall 
guarantee the capability of individuals to follow their free will, cf. Menke (footnote 1), 




politicisation and “de-moralization” (Entsittlichung)18 works by establishing the difference 
between bourgeois society (as pre-political) and politics, limiting politics to the securing of 
individual rights.19 Politics as a communal decision-making process is thus rendered im-
possible because no political will can be developed against the private will. 
The final chapter of Menke’s monograph is devoted to developing a new concept 
of law that allows to overcome the bourgeois-liberal pathology of depoliticisation. This 
concept is a re-politicised “new right” with counter-rights based on participation. The new 
right is intended to enable a re-politicisation of the individual will and democratic partic-
ipation while avoiding the pitfalls of political paternalism. Menke works through the prob-
lem of paternalism under the keyword “communism”, by which he means a political self-
determination of the community that is total and leaves no room for individual passivity – 
in communism, there is only politics. Herein lies an obvious – and rather classical – problem: 
Total democratic control and total politicisation can lead to paternalism. Individuals and 
minorities might be forced to adapt to society. In contrast to (total democratic and pater-
nalistic) communism, the new right is supposed to enable political self-determination and 
at the same time allow passivity, which is secured by counter-rights. The difference between 
liberal individual rights and counter-rights is that the latter are not rights to a naturalized 
individual will and its protection from political influence, but rights to the consideration 
of the perceptible and passivity in the process of political judgment. Since it abandons the 
concept of a private will and interest in a pre-political realm of the social that has to be 
protected against political influence, the new right opens up and supports the possibility 
for real political change; the political control of the social without predetermined (ideo-
logically bourgeois) limits. 
I would like to point out that the central insight of Menke’s theory is the connec-
tion of the critique of law with the theory of subjectification. Subjectivity and individual 
will are not pre-social, but consist of the result of subjectification in a particular society – 
in modern, bourgeois liberalism, this is subjectification based on individual rights. It con-
stitutes individuals who feel and think that it is natural to live a life of bourgeois amoral 
separation and who believe that any interference with their private and economic lives 
consists of paternalism. This is a critique of classical political liberalism and its negative 
concept of freedom. The question is whether this negative concept of freedom and the 
blindness towards subjectification can be overcome without making the nightmare of lib-
eralism – a paternalistic society – come true. 
III. Menke’s Deadlock: Radical Republicanism or Classic Liberalism 
My criticism of Menke is that he does not succeed in solving this challenge, because the 
counter-rights do not provide sufficient protection against political paternalism. In other 
 
demands for social rights are the bourgeois circle of intensification of government. Liberal 
rights produce social problems, which create the need for social rights, which produce 
paternalism, that creates the need for liberal rights, and the circle begins again. It is, how-
ever, not clear why this circle is an intensification, cf. Menke (footnote 1), 174–177, 202–
212. 
18 Menke (footnote 1), 228 
19 Cf. Menke (footnote 1), 228 f., 232 f. 
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words, Menke’s aim is to overcome the difference in political theory between a liberal and 
republican position, where the liberal position insists on universal rights of the individual 
and the republican position focuses on the political self-determination of the community.20 
But either, following a strong reading, the new right leads to radical republicanism that 
overrides the individual will through total politicisation, or, following a weaker interpreta-
tion, Menke’s counter-rights remain structurally identical with the liberal individual rights, 
and his conception cannot escape the liberal framework it aims to overcome. 
1. Strong reading: Radical republicanism. According to Menke, the problem is that 
the form of individual rights creates the individual private will, which is secured against 
political and social control and thereby set independent of it – individual rights create “the 
positive capacity for moral indifference”.21 He calls this “de-moralization” or “Entsit-
tlichung”. Against this, he argues for political control, which is not conceptually limited by 
privacy. This is a dangerous path, as it ignores the massive problem of paternalism through 
limitless politics. Many political achievements of minorities are secured by rights, using the 
liberal form of individual rights to demand protection from repressive and normalising 
politics. For example, important steps for the protection of the human rights to sexual self-
determination were shaped by the right to privacy of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights in the Toonen vs. Australia decision in 1994, which allowed consensual 
private gay sex.22 From a queer perspective, Menke’s vision of a completely political society 
without secure private spheres appears threatening, because uniform normalisation instead 
of diversity is to be expected in such a society. In short: From a minority perspective, indi-
vidual rights are a central political tool and it is not surprising that the radical and funda-
mental critique of such rights is not developed from the perspective of minority struggles, 
but rather through an abstract and universal philosophical analysis.23 
 
20 A goal he shares with Jürgen Habermas, despite the deep differences in philosophical 
methods and proposals for solution. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Drei normative Modelle der 
Demokratie, in Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, 1996, 277–292; and Jürgen Habermas, 
Zur Legitimation durch Menschenrechte, in Die postnationale Konstellation, 2001, 170–
192. 
21 Menke (footnote 1), 181 
22 Cf. Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, 
(31.03.1994), on the historical genesis, the current state and problems of the international 
human rights framework with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity see 
Karsten Schubert, Langer Weg zur sexuellen Selbstbestimmung, Vereinte Nationen 61 
(2013), 216–222. 
23 Here theoretical-political history repeats itself: From the US perspective Menke’s criti-
cism easily appears as a more sophisticated version of Critical Legal Studies (CLS), which 
offered radical legal critique from a Marxist perspective Peter Fitzpatrick (ed.), Critical 
legal studies, 1990; James Boyle (ed.), Critical legal studies, 1992. CLS was criticized by 
the Critical Race Theory because it reduces all politics to class struggle and ideology 
(Menke’s equivalent would be “form of subjective rights”), which makes CLS unable to 
recognize the importance of legal struggles in the fight against racism, see Patricia J. Wil-
liams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights, 1991; Nikol G. Alexandei Floyd, Critical Race 
Black Feminism: A “Jurisprudence of Resistance” and the Transformation of the Academy, 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 35 (2010), 810–820. 
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To formulate it more systematically, the problem of radical republicanism is that it 
is structurally anti-pluralistic, since it is based on a universalist concept of political reason 
and ignores political conflict. Against Lefort, Gauchet, Rawls, and implicitly all the theorists 
who work on post-foundational political thought and political difference,24 Menke insists 
that politics is about (universalistic) reason that is set against (particularistic) individuality.25 
According to Menke, reason is not only another particularity that has managed to become 
dominant through political struggles for hegemony, but the category of universalist political 
reason really exists and stands against individuality. This idealism is the opposite of a con-
flict-based political ontology, as it underlies the debate on the political and on post-funda-
mentalism, and also Foucault’s thinking of freedom.26 Assuming universalistic reason and 
ignoring pluralism is the philosophical basis for treating the problem of paternalistic nor-
malisation as secondary and totalising politics in relation to law. If, on the other hand, a 
pluralistic and conflictual political ontology with a perspectivist concept of reason is the 
starting point, it is possible to focus on a problem that Menke’s universalism blends out, 
namely how can political deliberation function without leading to paternalistic normaliza-
tion.27 It is precisely this problem that radical theories of democracy deal with, such as the 
approach of freedom as critique, which I present in the following section.28 
2. Weak reading: Counter-rights as protection. Since the radical republican reading 
leads to paternalism, I will now discuss a prima facie more attractive, weaker reading. At its 
 
24 See Claude Lefort / Marcel Gauchet, Über die Demokratie: Das Politische und die 
Instituierung des Gesellschaftlichen, in Autonome Gesellschaft und libertäre Demokratie, 
ed. Ulrich Rödel, 1990, 89–122; John Rawls, Political liberalism, 2005; Ernesto Laclau / 
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and socialist strategy, 2001; Chantal Mouffe, On the political, 
2008; Judith Butler / Ernesto Laclau / Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, hegemony, universality, 
Contemporary dialogues on the left, 2000; Jacques Rancière, Disagreement, 1999; Oliver 
Marchart, Die politische Differenz, 2011. 
25 “The obtainment of universality, however, is nothing else but a process of reason. Par-
ticular individuality, overwhelmed by each particular political decision, can only be non-
rational individuality: individuality against political reason” (Menke (footnote 1), 261). 
26 Cf. Karsten Schubert, Der letzte Universalismus. Kontingenz, Konflikt und normative 
Demokratietheorie, in Das Politische (in) der politischen Theorie, ed. Oliver Flügel-Mar-
tinsen / Franziska Martinsen / Martin Saar, 2021 (forthcoming), also online as Karsten 




27 There is a remarkable similarity between Isaiah Berlin and Foucault’s liberalism. Berlin 
too analyses the structural paternalism of theories by which intellectuals set out to philo-
sophically define what is good and right and at the same time explain the (un)freedom of 
those who disagree, in order to then ‘liberate’ them using coercive means, see Isaiah Ber-
lin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy / Ian Harris, 2002, 166–217. 
Foucault shares this concern and develops his genealogical method to avoid such pater-
nalism. 
28 See in this context also my proposal for a radical politicisation based on a particularist 
political ontology and perspectivist epistemology in Karsten Schubert, “Political Correct-




core is Menke’s proposal to overcome the difference between liberalism and republicanism 
through the new right and counter-rights. The counter-rights are intended to protect and 
enable non-participation in a generally communist conception of politics that equates free-
dom with political participation. They are supposed to put a stop to the paternalistic total 
politicisation, which I highlighted as the problem of the strong, that is, radical republican 
reading. However, it remains unclear to what extent the counter-rights really differ system-
atically from the liberal form of individual rights. While bourgeois individual rights essen-
tialize passivity (the perceptible) as a right and oppose it to political judgment, the counter-
rights affirm passivity, suffering and the perceptible by making it the starting point for 
political judgment.29 The best way to explain what could be meant by this, is a political 
process of developing policy that protects minorities, for example the development of a 
political position (judgment) which does not discriminate against gays by taking into ac-
count the suffering from past discrimination (perceptible feeling). However, the incorpo-
ration of perceptible feelings into judgment shall not essentialize them, but include the 
feelings into the political process and deliberate on them. The problem is again an oscilla-
tion between two possible interpretations: If there is no conceptual limit to the debates on 
the perceptible in politics, but political judgment has the power to define which perceptible 
feelings are to be considered and included and which are not, then the position amounts 
to radical republicanism and does not help in preventing its paternalism. Thus, in the frame-
work of homophobic political ‘reason’, the suffering of homophobia could be judged as a 
perceptible feeling that is a completely unproblematic side effect of good political educa-
tion for the ‘correct’ lifestyle and therefore does not need to be considered in political 
judgment. If, on the other hand, there is a limit to the politicisation of the perceptible, then 
the position does not differ conceptually from bourgeois-liberal law, whose essence, ac-
cording to Menke, is to set the perceptible free from political judgment. 
These problems become even more complicated when one considers that not only 
does the perceptible influence judgment, but vice versa, that judgment influences the per-
ceptible.30 Another question that Menke leaves open is how exactly the difference between 
the perceptible and judgment can be understood: In political struggles, the two typically 
mix. What, for example, is the status of the religious perceptible affect, which is clearly not 
just a physical affect, but a whole world view full of judgments. Another problem is that 
constructing the concept of counter-rights on the perceptible can lead to arguments based 
on an essentialist biologism, e. g. about the “nature” of “men” and “women” regarding the 
distribution of social obligations and privileges. The struggle for sexual self-determination 
is a good example of the problem of essentialising strategies. U. S.-American gays claim 
that they were born gay (biologically essentialist) to defend themselves against homophobic 
charges that homosexuality was an immoral lifestyle and therefore a free choice. But this 
“born-that-way” argument does not attack the assertion of immorality at all; thus, it is 
merely defensive and, moreover, does not protect against biotechnological modifications of 
 
29 Cf. Menke (footnote 1), 276–278. 
30 Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Constructing Love, Desire, and Care, in Sex, Preference, and 




sexual orientation when these become available.31 If individuals may only bring their per-
ceptible into political judgment, the politics that follow are structurally conservative. 
Systematically, this boils down to a general problem of conceptualising the percep-
tible as the basis of politics: It is anti-pluralistic. Taking perceptible feelings into account in 
politics is a much weaker protection than allowing a plurality of (amoral) individual wishes. 
For perceptible feelings are incorporated into universalistic reason and evaluated by it, 
whereas what is necessary is a protection of a plurality of reasons. Conceiving a plurality of 
reasons in a political community is conceptualized in political liberalism by the distinction 
of (universalistic) morality and (particular) ethics.32 
In conclusion, radical republicanism is problematic, and counter-rights can only 
prevent a relapse into radical republicanism if they are conceptual like individual rights, not 
only bringing the perceptible into political judgment, but also protecting arbitrary judg-
ment (of individual will and ethics) against political judgment. Menke does not resolve the 
tension between liberalism and republicanism, between law and politics, between the per-
ceptible and judgment. The concept of the new right is a deadlock, stuck between classic 
liberalism and radical republicanism. 
This critique opens the possibility to ask less radically and more realistically which 
individual rights are helpful for refugees and where politics is problematically blocked 
through the language of rights and its liberal subjectification. Furthermore, having pointed 
out that the central merit of Menke’s approach is the theory of legal subjectification and 
the central problem is its paternalistic anti-pluralism, it is now possible to ask how the 
problem of subjectification can be tackled without falling into anti-pluralism and paternal-
ism. In other words: Can there be a pluralist, that is, liberal way to address the problem of 
subjectification? 
IV. Foucault’s Freedom as Critique 
Using the Foucauldian notion of freedom as critique, it becomes possible to conceptualize 
what Menke’s project aims at but cannot realize because of the deadlock I discussed: to 
resolve the tension between liberalism and republicanism, law and politics, and to conceive 
of a critique of liberal rights that criticises the inner unfreedom of subjects and their sub-
jectification through law and yet is not paternalistic. Conceiving the problem as related to 
the concepts of freedom is key, as the unproductive alternative of classical liberalism and 
radical republicanism, in which Menke is stuck, is conditioned by the two associated con-
cepts of freedom: on the one hand, the classically negative concept of freedom, which 
Menke sees at the core of individual rights, and whose depoliticising effects he so aptly 
criticises. And on the other hand, the positive concept of freedom, that is rooted in a 
 
31 Cf. Edward Stein, Born That Way? Not A Choice?: Problems with Biological and Psy-
chological Arguments for Gay Rights, 2008; Edward Stein, Sexual Orientations, Rights, 
and the Body: Immutability, Essentialism, and Nativism, social research 78 (2011), 633–
658. 
32 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, 1992; Rainer Forst, Ethik und Moral, in 
Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öffentlichkeit, ed. Lutz Wingert / 
Klaus Günther, 2001, 344–371; Michel Rosenfeld, Law, justice, democracy, and the clash 
of cultures, 2011. 
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republican holistic social ontology following Hegel and Arendt, according to which free-
dom is equated with participation in community self-government. With freedom as cri-
tique, a concept in equidistance to the negative and positive concepts of freedom is now 
available. It offers a critique of individual rights just as radical as Menke’s, namely a critique 
of their subjectification following the “myth of the given”. And this without producing the 
usual costs: potentially unbridled political paternalism. For while the critique of subjectifi-
cations is itself a specific subjectification that always has a particular political content and is 
thus potentially paternalistic, freedom as critique aims at equipping individuals with the 
capability of a critique of subjectification. The core of the critical subjectification that fol-
lows from freedom as critique is the empowerment of individuals to the ever-increasing 
critique of subjectification, making this critical subjectification regime of critique the least 
paternalistic form of subjectification critique possible.33 
Central to this position is a nuanced conception of subjectification through law 
that can account for the institutional and legal conditions of critical-political subjectivity 
that Menke unquestioningly presupposes. Menke interprets subjectification in a purely re-
pressive way and therefore cannot conceive of it as a condition of the possibility of politics. 
In contrast, freedom as critique shows that critical subjects, who are the drivers of emanci-
patory politics, are only constituted through critical subjectification. And individual rights 
are one way of institutionalising critical subjectification. I call this position ‘reflective liber-
alism’ as it is based on individual rights and allows the reflective critique of their potentially 
repressive subjectification. 
I now describe – very schematically – the structure of the argument for freedom as 
a critique. The following steps of argumentation are the result of a reconstruction and cri-
tique of the social-philosophical debate on Foucault’s concept of freedom, which is the 
flesh of my monograph Freiheit als Kritik Sozialphilosophie nach Foucault34. For the sake of 
systematic conciseness, I will limit myself here to the argumentative skeleton. 
Subjectification means that subjects are constituted by power. Power is productive 
because it enables subjects to think and act; this means, however, that there are no charac-
teristics of the subject that can be said with certainty not to have been instantiated by power 
in the process of subjectification. In particular, no demanding capabilities can be assumed 
to be prior to subjectification. Subjectification is not passive suffering of the subject, but an 
 
33 That is why I also call freedom as critique “the last universalism” in post-fundamental-
ism, see Schubert (footnote 26). 
34 Karsten Schubert, Freiheit als Kritik, 2018a. There I examine four different strategies of 
interpreting Foucault’s work in relation to the problem of freedom, using exemplary texts 
representative of these strategies, and derive the concept of freedom as critique through 
an internal critique of these texts. The four strategies and their representatives are 1. Fou-
cault is coherent (Paul Patton, Taylor and Foucault on Power and Freedom, Political Stud-
ies 37 (1989), 260–276), 2. Foucault corrects himself (Thomas Lemke, Eine Kritik der po-
litischen Vernunft, 1997), 3. Foucault criticizes coherently (Martin Saar, Genealogie als 
Kritik, 2007), 4. Foucault is not enough (Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, 2008). 
This section of the present article is based on the chapter “Das Argument” in Freiheit als 
Kritik, pp. 305–312. For an extended discussion in English of freedom as critique see 
Karsten Schubert, Freedom as Critique. Foucault Beyond Anarchism, Philosophy & Social 
Criticism (2020b), 1–26. 
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active process of subjectifying oneself. However, the self-technologies used for this purpose 
are also suspected of not being formed by the subject itself, but rather instantiated by power. 
Subjectification is a problem of freedom because it leads to the well-founded suspicion that 
subjects are much more heteronomous than is generally assumed. This situation poses a 
problem for the concept of freedom: freedom can no longer consist negatively in non-
interference as there is no own and inner core of the subject, which would be exempt from 
the suspicion of being produced by power. Nor can freedom positively consist in the simple 
acceptance of and recognition through power, because it often has subjugating effects.35 
According to Foucault, power is productive, yet this leaves open whether its productive 
effects are repressive or liberating.36 The problem of subjectification consists of the question 
of how freedom can be conceived in this equidistant position from the negative and positive 
concept. 
Freedom in relation to the problem of subjectification means the capability to re-
flectively criticize one’s own subjectification.37 This capability makes it possible to deal with 
subjectification as a problem of freedom. It is a higher-level reflection than the first-order 
reflection created by subjectification, that can allow the transcendence of the reflection 
instantiated by subjectification. In other words, it is a particular self-technology whose op-
eration is the reflection of the potential heteronomy of all self-technologies. Although free-
dom as critique is also dependent on subjectification – wherefore ‘absolute’ freedom or 
freedom as a fixed status is impossible – as a movement that always aims beyond itself, it 
achieves as much distance and independence from subjectification as possible. It is an in-
ternalized, constant hermeneutics of suspicion that always critically examines everything, 
including itself. In doing so, it does not come to a standstill, but proceeds from critical 
operation to critical operation; it is therefore a practice (and not a status or condition), but 
still depends on capabilities.  
 
35 This problem of freedom was formulated regarding Foucault’s archaeological and gene-
alogical phase, in the works Michel Foucault, Madness and civilization, 1988; The order 
of things, 1970; Orders of discourse, Social Science Information 10 (1971), 7–30; Disci-
pline and punish, 1977. Extensive references to secondary literature on the interpretation 
of Foucault’s position and on the construction of the problem of freedom and the con-
cept of freedom can be found in Schubert (footnote 34). 
36 Foucault developed the concept of productive power in Foucault (footnote 35) and 
Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality, 1978; the ambivalence of productive power 
was discussed particularly with regard to Foucault’s lectures on governmentality Michel 
Foucault, Security, territory, population, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78 (ed. 
Michel Senellart), 2007; The birth of biopolitics, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
79 (ed. Michel Senellart), 2010. 
37 This concept of freedom is articulated in Foucault’s late reflections on his method of 
genealogical criticism, among others in Michel Foucault, What is Critique?, in The Poli-
tics of Truth, 1997, 41–81; What is Enlightenment?, in The Politics of Truth, 1997, 101–
134; see also Judith Butler, What is Critique, in The political, ed. David Ingram, 2002, 
212–226. Criticising the widespread Foucault reception, I point out that the concept of 
freedom as critique is completely different from the ethical concept of freedom in Fou-
cault’s late work on antiquity, cf. Karsten Schubert, Die christlichen Wurzeln der Kritik. 
Wie Foucaults Analysen der Kirchenväter neues Licht auf die Debatte um Macht und 
Freiheit werfen, ZfPhL 7 (2019), 60–71. 
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Through this operation of critique, this work on oneself, a subject can transform 
and emancipate itself from the subjectifications that have constituted it; it can thus develop 
independence and actual autonomy from the external power that constituted it. Something 
new is created that cannot be accounted to power. Freedom is an emergent level of oper-
ation in relation to the subjectifications that have constituted the subject: inner-psychic 
emergence. How exactly the new comes into the world cannot be predicted, but it can be 
said that this kind of inner-psychic emergence is more likely to occur through critical 
subjectifications. 
As a capability dependent on complex conditions, freedom as critique cannot be 
assumed presocially in the subject. Rather, subjectification theory suggests that freedom as 
critique should be understood as a result of subjectification – because the capabilities of 
the subject are instantiated by power in the process of subjectification. A paradigmatic case 
of such a liberal or critical subjectification is the genealogical critique, which encourages 
its readers to critically reflect on their own subjectification. 
However, stating the general possibility of freedom (through social criticism), the 
problem of subjectification is not yet solved, but only postponed. That freedom as critique 
is generally possible is correct, but as a result of the problematisation of freedom it is un-
satisfactory. For stating the general possibility of freedom cannot be regarded as a solution 
to this problem of freedom, at the heart of which lies the well-founded fear that we are 
much less free than we think. If one is satisfied with the statement “freedom is possible”, 
one must suspend the hermeneutics of suspicion – which is contradictory since it is essen-
tial in a Foucauldian understanding of power and freedom. In short, one loses sight of the 
problem as a social-philosophical one, if one is satisfied with statements in the modality of 
general possibility, because they are not an adequate answer to the well-founded fear of 
extensive subjectification through power. To state the general possibility in this way is too 
unspecific. This only clarifies that free subjectification as social criticism is always possible, 
but does not make any further statement about the conditions of its probability. 
An adequate answer lies in the change of modalities: Not general statements of 
possibility, but distinctions of different probabilities are necessary. Accordingly, the identifi-
cation of such social situations, in which critical subjectification is more likely to occur, can 
be considered a solution to the problem of subjectification. The aim is thus to identify 
modally robust practices with respect to critical subjectification, that is, those practices that 
are highly likely to subjectify critically under different circumstances. Such modally robust 
practices of subjectification can also be called subjectification regimes. The necessity of 
identifying regimes of critical subjectification also derives from the long-term effects of 
subjectification described above: Only if the critique of power that has liberating effects is 
iterated and works over an extended period it can be assumed that subjects develop the 
capability of freedom as critique. For this reason alone it is insufficient for the concept of 
freedom to state that critical subjectification is always possible, as such a statement does not 
rule out that it only appears occasionally and by chance. This “argument from modal ro-
bustness” is the crucial step of my argumentation beyond the existing literature on 
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Foucault.38 It leads to the necessity of transforming the problem of freedom into a question 
of the institutionalisation of critical subjectification. 
An obvious argument against this idea would show that freedom should not be 
located in the often repressive regimes of subjectification of political and legal institutions 
but in subjectification regimes of protest and subcultures. Thus, for example, queer critique 
of heteronormativity and the counter-hegemonic identities it creates, which subversively 
rewrite ‘normality’, can be examined as a prime example of critical subjectification. Ac-
cordingly, many Foucauldians, such as Amy Allen,39 argue for such localisation of freedom 
in protest culture. 
But such a location of freedom in a specific political project does not do justice to 
the proceduralist and conflictual character of freedom. When freedom is established as a 
particular ethical-political project, it loses its conceptual core of ever-increasing hyper-re-
flection, and it is suggested that the specific ethical-political subjectification that has been 
labelled good by the ethical-political theory of freedom is undisputed and universal. How-
ever, this is an inadmissible argument in the context of Foucault’s post-foundationalist 
framework. The hermeneutics of suspicion underlying freedom as critique assume that any 
particular thick theory of freedom can easily turn into repression. Therefore, it makes sense 
not only to locate freedom in protest movements but also to transform the question into a 
democratic-theoretical one, in which the problem of the potentially paternalistic norm-
setting of ethical-political projects, that is, the contested nature of freedom, can be dealt 
with. This argument goes beyond Foucault’s partly anarchist commitments and reframes 
the concept of freedom as critique as a matter of normative political theory. 
This first argument for locating freedom in democratic institutions is derived from 
the formal logic of freedom as critique, and it could be contradicted by conceptualising 
protest movements in such a reflective way that they are resistant against turning into re-
pression, while at the same time arguing that political institutions are fundamentally repres-
sive – Rancière calls them “police” for this reason.40 However, if one reconstructs the con-
cept of freedom by means of immanent critique as a normative value of late modernity41 
and thus establishes the goal of realising society-wide freedom, then the focus on (one’s 
own) political protest movement is not sufficient, but the general institutional design of 
society necessarily moves into focus. 
To sum up: If one combines this demand for universalisation that is contained in 
the normative concept of freedom with the requirements of modal robustness and the 
definition of freedom as critique as a formal principle of constant critical reflection against 
(political) normalisation, it follows that critical reflection should be practiced permanently 
and on a society-wide basis (and not only in political movements), because only in this way 
freedom for all is likely. Therefore, the danger that the establishment of such a freedom 
 
38 I develop the argument from modal robustness in detail through a discussion of Fou-
cault’s The Subject and Power and how it is falsely seen as a solution to the problem of 
freedom by many Foucauldians in Schubert 2020b (footnote 34). 
39 Allen (footnote 34) 
40 Cf. Rancière (footnote 24). 
41 Cf. Allen (footnote 34). 
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regime could itself have repressive effects cannot be ruled out but only adequately processed 
– through the constant self-suspicion of the hermeneutics of suspicion. 
Referring to the liberal distinction between morality and ethics, freedom should 
be placed at the level of morality, that is, it should be anchored in the general institutional 
design of society. Here, freedom as critique has the function of working in two directions: 
On the one hand, it demands self-reflective and self-critical political institutions that are 
open to change because the hermeneutics of suspicion is particularly vigilant against claims 
to political universalisation and the political paternalism that might go hand in hand with 
it. On the other hand, it demands the establishment of such regimes of subjectification that 
aim to instantiate freedom as critique in all subjects. Freedom as critique should thereby 
have an effect on all ethical-political projects and give its members the ability to take a 
critical stance on these ethical-political regimes of subjectification. 
The always also arbitrary ethical-political determination of freedom can only be 
countered by further critical processing. The initiative and the energy for this further pro-
cessing come from the individuals who transform themselves and thereby also criticize and 
change the institutions that subjectivize them. That they do so is more likely if they have 
been subjectified in terms of critique; from the perspective of freedom as critique, the 
dynamics of the institutions can thus be generated by the institutions themselves. And yet 
– and this is the decisive factor here, which is why I also call this a liberal reading of Foucault 
– criticism remains a matter of individuals. 
Freedom as critique achieves what Menke aims at: the repoliticisation of the indi-
vidual will. It aims at freedom from repressive subjectification, such as the subjectification 
through the liberal myth of the given, and therefore politically interferes with the individual 
will through critical subjectification. It thus overcomes liberalism’s boundary of the natu-
ralized individual will, that is, its attachment to a negative concept of freedom, which causes 
the pathological depoliticisation of liberal societies. Nevertheless, the repoliticisation 
through freedom as critique does not suffer from the danger of political paternalism in the 
way Menke’s new right does for two reasons. First, as it is not aimed at politicisation per se 
– this focus in Menke’s critique turned out to be structurally anti-pluralist – but it is aimed 
at individual freedom as critical reflexivity, which may lead to repoliticisation. And second, 
because it conceptualizes this critical reflexivity, which breaks through the liberal myth of 
the given, as the result of institutionalized critical subjectification. 
Such subjectification is not in contrast to the form of individual rights, which can 
protect against paternalism. On the contrary, the subjectification through individual rights 
can work as critical subjectification. Freedom as critique shows that there are subjective 
preconditions for politicisation: critical subjectivities. Menke, in his demand for a politici-
sation through the new law, does not take them into account. While Menke is right that 
subjectification through liberal law constitutes subjects without normative reasons that fol-
low the myth of the given, overcoming such subjectification necessitates an account of how 
critical subjectification can lead to the subjects’ capability to break through the myth of the 
given and transform both themselves and society. Rather than making the form of individ-
ual rights per se the object of legal critique, a differentiation between different individual 
rights and their effects on individuals and society is necessary. As Jay Bernstein pointed out, 
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albeit with a different vocabulary,42 the practice of claiming rights leads to critical subjec-
tivity – this is the positive, emancipating side of legal subjectification. Thus, law is not only 
a social system that has depoliticising effects, but it is also a central driver of political change 
and becoming through critical subjectification. Law, or more precisely critical subjectifica-
tion through individual rights, is a sphere of the solidification and institutionalisation of re-
politicisation through social critique. 
The abandonment of the discourse of the new right and the counter-rights, that 
are caught in the aporia of the old (negative and positive) concepts of freedom, and instead 
to build a theory of law on the concept of freedom as critique opens up new possibilities: 
Such ‘reflective liberalism’ allows to ask less radically and more realistically where politics is 
problematically blocked by the language of rights and its liberal subjectification, and which 
individual rights are nevertheless helpful and can even, as part of a regime of critical sub-
jectification, help in the critique of subjectification. 
V. Conclusion:  Institutionalising Transformation 
Menke claims that the inhumane treatment of refugees and migrants follows from the at-
omistic social ontology of liberalism: A society that conceives human beings only as bearers 
of individual rights, and not as members qua being human, will not care for those individ-
uals who are not sufficiently protected by the current legal regime, such as refugees. The 
current legal regime does not protect refugees and migrants, because the enjoyment of 
individual rights is effectively dependent on specific national citizenship – similar to the 
situation of stateless persons that Arendt already criticized 70 years ago. However, Arendt 
does not conclude that it is necessary to abandon individual rights in order to create a 
society based on real membership. On the contrary, with the notion of the right to have 
rights she demands the universal right to the inclusion into the legal realm, that is, the 
enjoyment of equal individual rights for everyone, which she imagines could be secured 
by the United Nations.43 
The discussion of Menke’s Critique of Rights and the Foucauldian concept of free-
dom as critique leads to a more nuanced position. Building on Menke’s critique, it is pos-
sible to identify the subjectification through individual rights in terms of the “myth of the 
given” as the fundamental reason for the blockade of politics that prevents a change of 
politics towards the realisation of the right to have rights. However, Menke’s proposal to 
radically transform politics by the new right, which is not blocked by individual rights, 
could lead to the very opposite of the realisation of the rights to have rights. It could lead 
to the abandonment of rights, especially of minorities that need legal protection such as 
refugees, through an anti-pluralist and paternalist politicisation. The reflective liberalism 
that follows from the Foucauldian notion of freedom as critique solves this problem by 
proposing a critique of subjectification that may open new possibilities for radical transfor-
mation without abandoning individual rights altogether. The realisation of the right to have 
rights, that is, the equal integration of all humans into legal protection, necessitates a radical 
transformation of ourselves and of our bourgeois and amoralistic liberalism. Individual 
 
42 See Jay Bernstein, Rights. <https://www.politicalconcepts.org/rights-bernstein/>, ac-
cessed 2019-03-01 16:44. 
43 Cf. Arendt (footnote 4), 769. 
 
17  
rights are not only part of the problem, but also part of the solution. The subjectification 
through individual rights does not only constitute the bourgeois “myth of the given”, but 
it can also lead to the critical subjectivities that from the basis of radical political transfor-
mation. Freedom as critique may serve as a starting point for the differentiation between 
these opposing effects of individual rights. 
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